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This article describes the argumentative structure of Hayek on the relationship between power 
to tax and redistribution. It is observed throughout its work giving special attention to two 
works: The Constitution of Liberty (1959) and Law, Legislation and Liberty, vol3, The Political 
Order of Free People, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979.) Hayek describes one of the 
arguments most complete information bout SFP progressive tax systems (progressive tax). 
According to the author the history of the tax progressive system, works against such a tax 
model and deploys a variety of arguments in his favorite spot by critics: liberal democracy.  
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No doubt that the imposition of exorbitant taxes, the recovery in 
peacetime may be so large as in the years of war or the charge of half 
the wealth of the nation and even the fifth part its, as any excessive 
abuse of power, prove the opposition of the people  
Adam Smith Lectures on Jurisprudence, p. 324.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
The Power to tax and taxation is geared towards the creation of mandatory conditions 
for people and organizations, imposed by a government to get resources to finance 
spending on public goods and services and to control the volume of private spending in 
the economy. In each case, tax policy has been classified in different ways. On the one 
hand direct taxes (taxes on income or wealth), on the other indirect taxes are taxes on 
transactions especially the price (tax on value added tax and excise).  
 
Above all, the progressive tax system and progressive taxation in general relates to a 
situation in which the proportion of income earned through taxation (tax rate) increases 
with income and purchasing power. Most tax systems in the world are progressive 
regularly. In others words, his achievement is accomplished through a system of 
increasing marginal tax rates as income increases
1
. It is possible to have a progressive 
tax cost in which the tax rates with increases in consumption expenditures. In this field 
are expanding as differences we see in this article
2
. 
                                                             
1
 Diversification of tax systems is a constant in economic history. Among the most prominent types are: 
Ad Valorem tax, poll tax, inflation tax, luxury tax, Pigovian tax, corporation tax, inheritance tax, specific 
tax, proportional tax, regressive tax, excise tax, tax on capital expenditure tax, Wealth tax, tax on business 
traffic, value added tax (VAT) tax on carbon emissions, income tax, purchase tax, Income Taxes capital, 
taxes on imports, payroll tax, sales tax, tax on excess wages, transfer tax, tax unit, import taxes and 
excise. For a detailed discussion: Macmillan Dictionary of Modern Economics, David W. Pearce, 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 1992.  
2 One of the most celebrated works in defense of progressive tax imposed has been the work of Edwin R. 
A. Seligman: Progressive Taxation in Theory and Practice, 1894. Seligman developed the history of 
progressive taxation and assessment of theory from Wagner socialists, Paine, Guicciardini, Marshall, 
Licht, the theory of profit which contrasts proportionality and progressivity, the theory of utility costs and 
their subsequent decay. Based on a broad portfolio of thinkers: Hobbes, Pufendorf, Turgot, Proudhon, 
Sartorius, Braun, Seligman identifies advocate line through the proportional tax benefit. And then 
 But, if power to tax is complex redistribution also has problems (Estrada, 2010a). Both 
systems contain aspects for the study and scope of the tax system. In the case of 
redistribution is related to a process of altering the distribution of income or wealth 
exists in society. Nevertheless, the redistribution can result from a deliberate policy of 
income among people or may be an effect "accidental" economic policy. It is generally 
possible to distinguish between monetary redistribution in which people were detracts 
or given money, and redistribution in kind, by which people are provided goods and 
services free or at subsidized rates.  
 
This article describes the argumentative structure of Hayek on the relationship between 
power to tax and redistribution. It is observed throughout its work giving special 
attention to two works: The Constitution of Liberty (1959) and Law, Legislation and 
Liberty, vol3, The Political Order of Free People, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1979.) Hayek describes one of the arguments most complete information bout 
SFP progressive tax systems (progressive tax). According to the author the history of 
the tax system works against such a tax model and deploys a variety of arguments in his 
favorite spot by critics: liberal democracy.  
 
Accordingly, the first describes the critique of Hayek SFP progressive tax systems 
(Hayek, 1959: 1979) from their conception of social order and fiscal rationality. Hayek 
envisions a reflection on a key principle in liberal democracies: most rule. Furthermore 
extends comments on the moral influence tax decisions.  
 
In summary, this article describes Hayek's viewpoint on taxation and consequently 
developments. In the context Hayek defends controversial extended arguments on 
proportional tax system. If a most rule corrects deviations from political power must 
also limit the progressive taxation conditions. According to Hayek the progressive tax 
system (SFP) violates a principle of constitutional law by creating more obligations 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
question it from the beginning of social and economic philosophy Gandillot, Bentham, Robespierre, 
Vauthier. The most salient components of the work of Seligman, however, are in the third part of this 
work where an application of principle to power progressive tax in the United States and Spain. (la 
traducción al español: El impuesto progresivo en la teoría y en la práctica, Trad. I. Víctor Paret, Madrid, 
1913 [en la Biblioteca de la Universidad Externado de Colombia, Clasificado: 336.293. S 464 i, ej.1]) 
 
between those who work for the growth of the economy, in this sense, the progressive 
tax system operates counter to principles of democratic justice.  
 
The argument is that the potential addition of a tax collecting duties commensurate with 
a broad base (e.g. VAT) always tends to be greater than that of a highly progressive tax 
on a more or less comparable. For this purpose, the argument suggests that a shift to 
more restrictive constitutional guarantees of uniformity of the tax rate may be 
undesirable. The argument rather indicates that in some cases, equal tax treatment can 
be guaranteed at the cost of more stringent safeguards against the absolute limits of 
income (Estrada, 2010c).  
 
Hayek's argument against the progressive tax system 
 
One of the central hypothesis focuses on Hayek's assessment of the political economy
3
 
that has given rise to a progressive tax system SFP
4
. This system is for the author 
against the spirit of open and liberal society because higher tax rates imposed by the 
higher rents
5
. It establishes a bias on economic wealth and affects the incentives of 
working age. Hayek's viewpoint in this chapter is openly polemical. 
 
 
 
                                                             
3
 Friedrich Hayek's work is a real paradigm in almost all areas uncovered by the contemporary economic 
theory, whether in a higher level of scale: monetary problems, financial systems, foreign trade, pricing 
system and so on, down to a micro level: psychology rational preferences, markets, labor system, 
consumerism, etc.. Samuelson recently led a tribute applauded by the international scientific community: 
―Personal report, A few remembrances of Friedrich von Hayek (1899–1992)‖, Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 69 (2009) 1–4; Andrew Farrant, Edward McPhail, ―Hayek, Samuelson, and the 
logic of the mixed economy?‖. T.Damjanovic,D.Ulph / EuropeanEconomicReview, Sep. 2009. Hayek 
contrasts between Adam Smith, Daniel B. Klein., Smith –Hayek: Economist: From Character to identity‖, 
Institute of Economic Affairs 2007. Further: G. R. Steele, Friedrich A. Hayek, ―The Complete 
Economist‖, Institute of Economic Affairs 2008, pp. 67 – 69. Dos estudios biográficos Bruce Caldwell, 
Hayek’s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 
2003, pp. 500; Alan Ebenstein, Hayek’s Journey: The Mind of Friedrich Hayek (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 288. 
4 Although the chapter we discuss Hayek develops a detailed history of the SFP, the latest developments 
and relying on econometric models can already be axiomatic in: Tatiana Damjanovic,, DavidUlph "Tax 
progressivity, income distribution and taxation-compliance", European Economic Review, Sep. 2009. 
5 The concept of Open Society is a legacy of Karl R. Popper political debate during the period after World 
War II. We know from the same notes that Hayek was estimated by the philosopher of Vienna. Popper's 
arrival at the London School of Economics was achieved through the good offices of the economist. 
Some authors observed significant differences on this concept, see for example: Naomi Moldofsky: 
―Open Society: Hayek vs. Popper?‖ Economic Affairs, april-june 1985. 
This is recognized: 
 
For many reasons I would like to skip this chapter. The dialectical contradiction 
criteria used so widespread, it will necessarily have to offend many. Even those 
who have followed me this far, reasonable considering all of my posture, 
probably think my views on radical tax system is clearly also not possible to 
make them
6
. 
 
 
Problems are closely related to the area of taxation and the tax structure but mechanisms 
significantly affect a range of fields related to equality and freedom. This is the central 
premise of the arguments presented and the reasons why your thoughts have scope to 
our time. The act of generating wealth is linked to a fundamental concept designed to 
describe liberties concerns. Hayek notes that fiscal problems are partly to its 
foundations in moral philosophy practiced by society
7
. 
 
Furthermore, the contradictory nature of SFP progressive tax system with respect to a 
proportionate tax system is also reflected in the imbalances that promotes and freedoms 
denied (Nicolò De Vecchi, Hayek and the General Theory, 2006, Wenli and Pierre-
Daniel Sarte, Progressive Taxation and Long-Run Growth, 2004). In particular, while a 
proportional tax burden seems to better fit the criteria of political equality, the SFP 
impairs the basic incentives of competition in the markets and wealth is subordinated to 
the democratic vote of most. Tax Saving subject to trends and changes introduced by 
the legislature. One goal of Hayek is oriented to describe with classical liberalism 
illegitimate transfers of political power
8
.  
 
Recall that the progressive tax system is one of the fundamental methods of income 
redistribution (N. Gregory Mankiw and Matthew Weinzierl, ―The Optimal Taxation of 
Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution ", 2009, Nicolas and Patrick 
                                                             
6 Friedrich A. Hayek, Los Fundamentos de la Libertad, Octava Edición, Unión Editorial, Madrid, 2008, p. 
407, 408. 
7 Hayek's relations with the classical tradition are unavoidable, particularly with the Theory of Moral 
Sentiments by Adam Smith. See op., Daniel B. Klein, ―The Smith-Hayek. Economist: From Character to 
Identity ", p. 4; Amos Witztum, ―Smith's theory of actions and the moral significance of unintended", The 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought 15:3 401-432 September 2008. 
8 The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (The Colllected Works of Friedrich August Hayek, Volume 
I) Routledge y Chicago University Press, 1988;  Hayek, Friedrich A., Principios de un orden social 
liberal, Unión Editorial, S. A. Madrid, 2001. 
 
Pintus Dromel , "Are Progressive Income Taxes Stabilizing?", 2008). So your exposure 
Hayek critique means to attack one core of prejudices inherited on tax matters. Again, 
the rise of progressive taxation had its early origins in invoking fraudulent false 
pretenses; Hayek mentions his defense in Marx and Engels and their opponents in the 
economic history of liberalism
9
: 
 
Among many arguments in support of this thesis and that still survive in the 
textbooks of Public Finance, was imposed which ultimately gave more 
scientific appearance of progressive rate tax. The basis of this dialectic is none 
other than the diminishing marginal utility of the successive acts of 
consumption. Despite or perhaps because of its abstract nature, this theory has 
gained support scientifically predicament to what until then had been and was 
admitted on the basis of arbitrary assumptions
10
.  
 
 
In the controversy Hayek defines the historical and methodological conditions gave way 
to the imposition of the SFP
11
. A lesson based on false assumptions and describes how 
the harsh polemics on the value and usefulness undermined the premises SFP support. 
Furthermore the difficulties to quantify or compare the utility felt by different subjects. 
Similarly, Hayek accuses weaknesses on the concept of value for tax analysis methods. 
The defense as a criterion to prove a burden on redistributive means, according to 
Hayek: "a serious mistake‖12. 
  
                                                             
9
 The historical line of argument followed by Hayek ranging from fiscal policy in Renaissance Italy, the 
French Revolution until the period after World War II, reviewing a voluminous tradition from Florence 
(Italy) during the second half of the sixteenth century, compares regions fundamental geopolitical Europe 
and America: Britain, Germany, United States, reviewing outstanding authors of classical liberal 
tradition: John Stuart Mill, Edgeworth, Wieser, Marx and Engels. 
10 Friedrich A. Hayek, Op. Cit., 411. 
11
 Domenic Antonio Faust, Italian economic historian, interprets the fiscal tradition with criteria different 
from those of Friedrich A. Hayek. In the Italian tradition of public finance the issue of redistributing 
wealth and reducing inequalities through the SFP does not follow a strictly utilitarian ethics applied to tax 
problems. These utilitarian principles are abandoned in the historical context of the Italian fiscal power. 
This argument is due, according to Faust, the egalitarian nature of political tradition in Italy. The 
maximalist approach of individual utility is unknown to this tradition, Italians, according to Faust; seem 
closer to the criteria of justice as fairness in John Rawls. See: "The Italian theories of progressive 
taxation", Euro. J. History of Economic Thought 15:2 293-315 June 2008. 
12
 Until today that is controversial SFP can not solve the basic problems of tax reform. It is assumed that 
an increase in personal allowances helps the tax system becomes more progressive. This assumption takes 
into account that fiscal responsibility is never equal to zero. But what happens if we generalize? ie, we get 
those with zero personal income taxes paid. Well, would change completely our conception of the SFP. 
There will be difficulties in analyzing the emissions rights and related income tax deductions and credits. 
We will have a very different record on the books of accounts. This shows that the tax burden becomes 
more progressive as far as performance-enhancing. We have no other choice. An extension to this 
argument: Michael Keen, Harry Papapanagos and Anthony Shorrocks, ―Tax Reform and Progressivity‖, 
The Economic Journal, 110 ( January), 50-68 
The criticism of the author breaks down the opposing arguments in the field of political 
economy: tax progression did not benefit the poorest; the profit fell to class better 
equipped and the lower strata of the middle classes, who supplied the largest number of 
voters
13
. In the same way, Hayek stresses how different interest groups may push the 
tax changes. The economic policies depend on interests external to the economy itself. 
A determination of income decreasing productive are limited for ideological reasons
14
. 
Hayek emphasizes the political nature of the progressive tax system to highlight 
responsibilities
15
. 
 
Contrasting upon revenue derived from the progressive tax system, Hayek supports that 
revenues are minimal when compared with negative effects on production and incomes 
increased volume
16
. Record the highest income tends to reproduce a broken string on 
those who generate more and better income opportunities. Redistributing the wealth 
suggests the market entry of a hand visible and clearly skewed to make decisions that 
affect everyone.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
13 Friedrich Hayek, Op. Cit. Ibíd., pp. 414,415. 
14 Rivalries in the economic tradition go by the dichotomy between scientific theories versus ideology. 
The issue is not easily resolved. In previous work I have reviewed the controversies and disputes in the 
economic debate. In especial the arguments presented by Daly / Bhagwathi about the advantages of free 
trade (Estrada, 2006). 
15
 Those who recognize the argumentative structure of modern law, particularly in the context of German-
legal tradition that goes back to Kant can be seen that Hayek proposes to enter the opposite field in order 
to play the cards (arguments) of their adversaries. An original episode Kant succeeds in writing the run to 
the Critique of Pure Reason. 
16 But the impact of fiscal shocks not only had macroeconomic consequences, the work of Burnside / 
Eichenbaum / Fisherc, "Fiscal shocks and their consequences" investigates labor shocks arising from 
fiscal policy in the U.S. after the Second World War. These fiscal shocks were associated with overall 
increases in private consumption‖. The authors describe and apply a methodology to assess whether the 
neoclassical models could account for the consequences of a fiscal policy shock. See, Journal of 
Economic Theory 115 (2004) 89-117. 
One of the conflicting evidence of the SFP is comparative studies that Hayek is among 
United States, Britain, France and Prussia. Based on the work of G. Shirra Findlay and 
L. Rosta, in 1943: 
 
Rent 
  
                Percentage absorbed taxation 
(L) 
     100 …………………………………………………………… 18 
 150 ………………………………………………………….. 16 
 200 ………………………………………………………….. 15 
 250 ………………………………………………………….. 14 
 300 …………………………………………………………… 12 
 350 ………………………………………………………….. 11 
 500 ………………………………………………………….. 14 
 1000 ………………………………………………………….. 19 
 2.000 ………………………………………………………….. 24 
 2.500 ………………………………………………………….. 25 
 5.000 ………………………………………………………….. 33 
 10.000 ………………………………………………………….. 41 
 20.000 ………………………………………………………….. 50 
 50.000 ………………………………………………………….. 58 
 
      G. Findlay Shirras y L. Rostas, The Burden of British Taxation, Cambridge University Press, 1943. En Hayek (416). 
 
In his commentary Hayek observes that: 
 
The studies agree that, in general, middle-income taxpayers, who give the 
largest number of voters, were the least punished, while the minimum income, 
on par with the highest incomes, burdened with an overall proportion much 
heavier
17
. 
 
 
The data show the case of Britain, where in 1936 - 37, total tax burden of families with 
two children was 18 percent for those whose annual income stood at 100 pounds and 
decreased gradually to a minimum of 11 percent for 350 pounds, to rise again to 19 
percent with only 1000 pounds. In brief, Hayek to prove that "the most needy are not 
the biggest benefit, but the classes that forms a majority the majority in voting, and also 
that everything that was obtained by the progression could have achieved tax burden of 
middle-income earners as intensely as they do with the poorest groups
18
. 
                                                             
17
 Ibíd., pp. 416, 417. 
18 An update that shows the tax and investment behavior in the U.S. during the last period: Douglas G. 
Steigerwald and Charles Stuart. "Econometric Estimation of Foresight: Tax Policy and Investment in the 
Majority rule  
 
Since modern democracies have established their power in ideals of equality and most 
shareholder. A majority election manifesto the chosen conditions of governance and 
political power reflects their decisions, Hayek uses the same principles to contest the 
democratic system failures in the mechanisms of its implementation. In the case of this 
progressive tax, "means an open invitation to discrimination, and, worse, the majority to 
discriminate against a minority, so the assumption is purely arbitrary judicial want" 
(Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson, "The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, 
Taxation, and Politics," American Economic Review 2009, 99:4, 1218-1244). 
  
In line with the absurd, Hayek becomes the democratic virtues of the most in a 
dangerous environment for the generation of economic policies: "The most for the 
simple fact of being, is considered the power to impose the sacrifices she rejects 
minority is to violate a principle of greater importance than the democratic principle 
itself, since it involves going against the very logic of democracy‖. For instance, the 
plot unfolds to a high of majorities to show how to sacrifice a liberal principle
19
.  
Converting a political achievement in tax power approach represents a departure from 
the same democratic principles
20
.  
 
Hayek notes that the structural scope of a progressive tax system can get to a 
deterioration of the structure of the economy and production systems (Lombardo / 
Sutherland 2004)
21
. The overall economic balance derived from the progressive tax is 
less than its achievements. Namely, one of these negative effects is investments. A 
fiscal policy that overloads the tax liability tends to limit the risks taken by investors. 
Private capital are unattractive place their money with regulatory and fiscal obstacles to 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
United States", The Review of Economics and Statistics, by the President and Fellows of Harvard College 
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1997, pp. 32 to 40. 
19 In almost all his writings the means used by Hayek against the principle of majority is held in a 
technique or mechanism of argument that stresses the qualities and differences. In particular, this message 
Hayek has been shared in the liberal tradition from Stuart Mill to Popper, including less radical liberals 
like Isaiah Berlin and Norberto Bobbio. 
20 In the language of G. H. von Wright is transfer semantics (logic) illegitimate. The deviation in this case 
leads to changes in a different order to the phenomena that gave it its origin. 
 
21 Giovanni Lombardo, Alan Sutherland: ―Monetary and fiscal interactions in open economies‖, Journal 
of Macroeconomics 26 (2004) 319–347. 
earnings. The extension of the SFP regressive effect on poor countries is greater poverty 
and inequality
22
.  
 
Another negative characteristics attributed to Hayek SFP relates to limitations into 
economic development. Thus, setting limits on income and income as the only reward 
specific act counter to productivity and growth. The author believes that progressive 
taxation punishes injured and "own resources who manage their own risk. The message 
for investors and entrepreneurs is contradictory: the tax punishes entrepreneurship and 
business initiative as both industrial: 
 
The progressive taxation in general, favors corporations at the cost of each 
saving and, above all, strengthens the position of existing firms to the detriment 
of new entrants (p. 424). 
 
This value judgment about the progressive tax system has, according to Hayek, social 
consequences unavoidable because progressive taxation leads to a paradoxical effect: 
perpetuates inequalities. Contrary, to decrease the unequal economic relations SFP 
provides inertial terms because denying opportunities for social mobility and economic 
advancement (Piketty / Saenz, 2006)
23
 the tendency to introduce progressive taxation is 
to encourage feelings of envy among those who see the fortunes and wealth beyond 
(Buchanan / Tullock, 1962, John Rawls. 1971; Robert Nozick, 1974)
24
. 
 
Most important, the progressive tax system has a variant moral opposite of democratic 
equality predicates
25
. The author posits limits to allow governments to give fiscal 
instruments to correct deviations in the distribution of wealth. The moral alternative, 
                                                             
22
 Observations with recent applications are available at: Iraj Hashi a, Jan Mladek, "Fiscal and Regulatory 
Impediments to the Entry of New Firms in Five Transition Economies", Journal of East-West Business, 
vol. 6 (2) 2000, pp. 59 to 94. 
23
 Piketty/Saenz, ―The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective‖, AEA 
Papers and Proceedings, May. 2006, pp. 200 – 205. 
24 The theme of envy in the economic sphere corresponds to a venerable tradition dating back to classical 
Greek and Christian tradition; Dante and St. Thomas make up a portfolio of mortal sins, in Machiavelli 
expresses envy opposite behavior to the moral virtues of civic life. Mandeville and Adam Smith made 
reference to jealousy and its effects on individual and collective experience. Envy is also subject in 
Descartes, Hobbes, Hume and Kant. The recovery of the classical tradition comes from the contemporary 
neocontractualism Buchanan / Rawls / Nozick. 
25 About moral sentiments in the economic field, Hayek has deployed a unique wisdom in the classical 
liberal tradition. See for instance his notes: The Fatal Conceit: the Errors of Socialism, (especially 
chapter V), Chicago University Press, 1988. 
 
however, incorporates a planned political principle of equality makes it difficult to see 
the differences relevant to competition in a market system.  
 
Of course, in countries where the income tax regime has introduced 
higher rates, the egalitarian desire embodied preventing anyone can 
have incomes above certain limit
26
. 
 
The problem is to Hayek in how the tax burden can affect the total revenue. Something 
the author contests identified as such economic behavior Britain after the First World 
War
27
. So we set limits on the increase in income is part of a moral prejudice. With this 
logic, Hayek believes that poor countries will lower the most allowable income and 
"more difficult it is to make income residents in wealthier countries worldwide 
considered moderates‖28. 
 
Hayek rejects populism as a policy for spending
29
. The issue is the moral justification 
when a majority fixed income and the most possible error affecting "who believe they 
are benefiting the masses as well. The distinction that strikes tributary to the rich to help 
the poor far from providing the output to a problem of equity in the distribution of 
wealth creates more risk and more fiscal imbalances. Furthermore, the effects are 
contradictory: economic growth retardation and difficulties in obtaining higher quality 
of income. 
 
The moral prejudice is not a reasonable defense: 
 
It is unfair to pretend that the most is allowed to transfer, by discrimination, 
taxation in the minority, that a service can remunerated differently depending on 
who the service provider and an entire estate simply because you have an 
income other than their peers , is deprived of incentives and rewards provided 
by the act of others
30
. 
 
                                                             
26
 Friedrich A. Hayek, Los Fundamentos de la Libertad, Octava Edición, Unión Editorial, Madrid, 2008, 
p. 426. 
27
 Véase, pp. 414 – 416. 
28
 Some of these biases are found Hayek in the history and the relations established with the mysterious 
world of trade and money. An initial contempt toward trade issues that are often expressed in economic: 
ignorance and suspicion of intellectuals toward money and finance. the condemnation of the profit and 
contempt for business. An extension to these observations: The Fatal Conceit, (1988), pp. 149 to 171. 
29
 Véase: Hayek, 1976. 
30 Ibíd., p. 427. 
The argument shows how Hayek moves between the arguments of their opponents. If a 
central predicate of liberalism is the defense of right of persons ergo, the protection of 
private initiative, the most can not impose taxes discrimination without disturbing the 
proceedings. In synthesis, democracy can not punish the qualifications or distinctions to 
improve the supply in the markets. 
 
Taken to an extreme, what Hayek questions the answers are not tax inequality, but the 
mechanisms of punishment unjust to a minority that can be provided wealth. In fact, the 
dominant role of government policy on the tax burden is a trend that affects the flawed 
economic system. Hayek defends the autonomy of markets as interventionist response 
to the excesses of governments to see how the progressive tax was creating an 
unspecified number of unique mechanisms that ended upset the policy own revenue 
31
. 
The experience exposes us "how quickly the habit dulls the sense of justice and 
principle amounts to what (omit) has no other basis than envy‖32. 
 
The moral sentiments border between the taxation and power to tax. Monetary 
externalities eventually abysmal display gaps in society, above all when riches do not 
have reasonable linkages to production and employment generation
33
. In view of envy, 
Hayek provides an impenetrable barrier to the distinctive growth potential that exceeds 
the average income. In other words, this is an inverted projection within the tax system 
that is as bad as those who risk making major advantages in the market.  
 
Hayek uses the absurd to put retaliatory tax liability just between advocates of 
progressive taxation: 
 
To make a fair tax system, is obliged to respect the following rule: the most it 
that set the total amount of the tax burden has to endure, in turn, the maximum 
rate of tax. There is no reason, however, who opposes most alluded to improve 
the lot of economically weaker minority share proportional reduction in pay
34
. 
 
                                                             
31
 The ingenious method of deductible expenses of representation, the companies had to implement the 
policy to avoid additional taxes, lawyers, etc. are examples of the cure worse than the disease. See Hayek, 
Ibid. p. 427. 
32 p. 428. 
33
 These are deviations from the economy in societies affected by income from speculative capital. Or 
inequalities caused by the movement of money or criminal mafia. 
34 Ibíd., p 428. 
As a result, Hayek's argument seeks to defend a proportional tax burden and challenge 
the progressive taxation rate. His argument moves between dissociative technique (most 
versus minority), and the mechanism of the differences (quantity versus quality). If the 
tax is political outcome of a decision by majority, its direct effect is that they meet the 
obligations. And being that the exit leads to resolve the position of the least advantaged, 
applies the same way the principle of proportional fairness. 
 
The problem with Hayek is in the progressive model is perverse effect in time. Once 
started the trend seems to exceed the established limits. The defect does not result from 
the amount allocated or targeted tax discrimination, but of the nature of the progressive 
principle. He also stated in The Road to Serfdom: 
 
 
... The close interdependence of all economic phenomena makes planning 
difficult to stop precisely at the desired point, and that, once beyond a certain 
limit obstructed the free market, the planner will be forced to extend its 
interventions to covering everything. These economic considerations, that 
explain why it is impossible to stop the deliberate control exactly where you 
would like there, are greatly enhanced by certain political and social trends 
whose influence is felt increasingly extends under planning 
35
. 
 
 
The moral costs of progressive taxation exceed the relative advantages of its 
implementation. Hayek is inclined towards a principle that ―marks a ceiling on direct 
taxes to the entire tax burden‖. A rule setting a maximum rate (marginal) direct tax 
equal to the percentage of national income that the State absorbed expenses. For 
example, if the tax burden diverts 25 per 100 of national income, direct taxes must not 
exceed 25 per 100 in personal income. If the policy increase that percentage, just as it 
will increase the proportion allocated to these taxes. And will be reduced when the tax 
burden reduced. 
 
This approach anticipates fiscal monetary conditions because it allows showing 
mechanisms to limit government spending. Progressivity is not excluded, since those 
                                                             
35 Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents— The Definitive Edition, University of 
Chicago Press, 2007. (En español: Camino de servidumbre, Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2006). 
 
 
who pay the highest tax rates no longer pay certain indirect taxes, bringing its total 
contribution would be higher than the national average. Because, who earn lower 
incomes will be required not only on indirect taxes paid. In these cases, however, 
progressivity affects only the amounts paid by indirect taxes, maintaining a proportional 
basis to the midline. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Finally, progressive taxation is a situation in which the proportion of income earned 
through taxation (tax rate) increases with income and purchasing power. A majority of 
countries in the world after World War II adopted the SFP progressive tax system in 
response to demands for resolution of social inequalities. The reactions of their 
adversaries contain arguments that extend the debate on issues that are essential as 
demonstrated in Hayek (1959, 1979). 
 
Hayek's position stands out because it helps to get a fuller picture of the history and 
issues arising from the power to tax. The author notes that gaps SFP changes arising 
from taxation and tax power principles of equality. In short, rivalries between equality 
of political rights and demands for equal economic rights. This tense controversy of 
modern philosophy between equality and freedom, would decide the details of the tax 
burden in modern states.  
 
In line with classical liberalism, Hayek defends as necessary distinctions between 
market and state. A liberal system of social order can not impose restrictions on private 
initiative, nor to cap gains resulting from those who risk their capital in the market. 
Again, the liberal defense of personal freedom encompasses respect to capital can 
encourage people. So a spontaneous market set its own balance without direct 
government intervention.  
 
The progressive tax system sacrifices principles of democracy. Equality does not apply 
because of the discrimination that a most imposed on a minority. Hayek's arguments are 
extremely controversial. The majority amount approving tax measures should logically 
bear higher tax burdens directly. But it's not what happens. Because a minority of 
production that takes risks in the market, is most affected by the SFP. Discrimination 
policy involves inequalities perpetuated in time. The potential for mobility and 
economic and social dynamics in an open market are severely constrained. 
  
Hayek has been proposed to show that the SFP is rooted in a moral prejudice, envy. The 
difficulties that human beings have to accept their differences are reflected by means of 
wealth. Hayek's argument controvert pass a tax burden based on the value or merit. In 
contrast, envy is transferred to the field of economic interests to eliminate competition. 
Envy seriously affects the differences in income and production. The so-called moral 
hazard is a key instrument of markets, and envy in this case suggests avoiding it.  
 
In summary, basically in the context of an allegedly democratic model of politics, F. A. 
Hayek has developed different proposals for tax reform that may permit further 
attention. As Hayek (1959, 1979), argues against escalation in the structures of the types 
of income tax.  
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